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DAWSON V. DELAWARE
112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Ajury convicted David Dawson of first degree murder, possession
of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, and various other
crimes. Following Dawson's conviction, the trial court conducted a
penalty hearing before the jury to determine whether Dawson should be
sentenced to death for the first degree murder conviction. At this point
in the proceeding, the prosecution gave notice that it would introduce
evidence of the defendant's prior membership in the Aryan Brotherhood,
a white racist gang, which included evidence of the defendant's gang-
related tatoos. The prosecution also stated that it would introduce expert
testimony regarding the nature and origin of the Aryan Brotherhood.
Dawson responded to the State's intentions by arguing that this
evidence was inflammatory and that its admission would infringe on his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association. As a
result, the parties agreed to a stipulation stating that "the Aryan Brother-
hood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960s in
California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs
calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state
prisons including Delaware." Dawson agreed to the stipulation after the
prosecution stated that it would not call any expert witnesses to testify
about the Aryan Brotherhood. Dawson's agreement to the stipulation,
however, was conditioned on a continuing objection that his constitu-
tional rights had been violated by the admission of the Aryan Brother-
hood evidence.
At the penalty phase, the prosecution read the stipulation and
introduced evidence that Dawson had tattooed the words "Aryan Broth-
erhood" and "Abaddon" (the name the defendant had given himself upon
joining the Brotherhood) on his body. The defense presented as mitigat-
ing evidence the testimony of two family members and evidence that
Dawson had earned good time credits in prison for enrolling in various
drug and alcohol programs. After both sides presented aggravating and
mitigating evidence, the jury found three statutory aggravating circum-
stances: (1) that the murder was committed by an escaped prisoner, (2)
that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary, and
(3) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gains. Each circum-
stance made Dawson eligible for the death penalty under Delaware law.
The jury concluded that the aggravating evidence outweighed the miti-
gating evidence and sentenced Dawson to death.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the
death sentence. 1 The Delaware court stated in response to Dawson's
constitutional claims that "[p]unishing a person for expressing his views
or for associating with certain people is substantially different from
allowing ... evidence of [the defendant's] character [to be considered]
where that character is a relevant inquiry." 2 Thus, because the introduc-
tion of the contested evidence focused the jury's attention on Dawson's
character and did not appeal to the jury's prejudices concerning race,
religion or political affiliation, the court upheld its introduction during
the penalty phase. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
introduction of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding that shows
1 Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990).
2 Id. at 1103.
3 Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093,1097 (1992).
4 Id. at 1099.
5 103 S.Ct. 3418 (1983).
6 Dawson, 112 S.Ct. at 1099.
7 Id. at 1097.
that the defendant was a member of a white racist prison gang.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not erect aper
se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations
are protected by the First Amendment. 3 However, the Court stated that
in this case the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence proved
nothing more than Dawson's abstract beliefs and that this type of
evidence cannot be viewed as relevant "bad" character evidence in its
own right.4 In addition, the Court held that the prosecution did not meet
the relevance standard set forth in Barclay v. Florida,5 as it failed to show
any connection between Dawson's abstract beliefs and the issue being
tried.6 Thus, the Court held that the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood
evidence by the trial court was constitutional error.7 Justice Thomas was
the lone dissenter.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Use of Constitutionally Protected Activity
as Aggravating Evidence
The Court in Dawson concluded that "Dawson's First Amendment
rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence
in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson's
abstract beliefs." 8 The Court noted that the prosecution had originally
claimed that it would introduce expert witnesses who would testify that
the Aryan Brotherhood was a prison gang that advocated, among other
things, violent prison escapes, murder of fellow inmates, and drug use.
The Court suggested that this type of evidence would have presented a
much different case. The majority concluded that "Delaware might have
avoided this problem if it had presented evidence showing more than
mere abstract beliefs on Dawson's part, but on the present record one is
left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed
simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehen-
sible."9
The Court's opinion could be seen as having a built-in expansion
clause for the admission of aggravating evidence. The case, if not read
carefully, seems to imply that if the prosecution simply details "abstract
belief' evidence, the Court will find otherwise impermissible evidence
admissible. Because the Court did not clearly distinguish between
"abstract beliefs" and "active advocacy," the prosecution may attempt to
read the case as one in which any type of "abstract belief' evidence is
admissible, so long as the beliefs are sufficiently detailed.
Defense counsel should strongly argue against any such prosecutorial
interpretation as a misreading of Dawson. Because this is a First
Amendment issue, in order to admit evidence based on a group's beliefs,
the prosecution must go beyond simply establishing that the defendant is
a member of a particular group, but must show an active advocacy and
pursuit of the group activities and goals. 10 Even then, the prosecution
8 Id. at 1098.
9Id.
10 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1960) (stating
that under the First Amendment mere association would not support
Smith Act conviction; rather, there must be clear proof that a defendant
specifically intended to accomplish the aims of the organization).
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must show that the belief is relevant to the issue being tried.1 1 Thus,
Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood might be relevant if he
had actively tried to implement certain of the Aryan Brotherhood's goals,
such as racial killings. But absent such activity, evidence of his beliefs
based solely upon membership would be protected by the First Amend-
ment, no matter how detailed the proof of the group's belief.
In Zant v. Stephens,12 the court significantly expanded the role
of aggravating factors by allowing the trier of fact to consider almost any
type of aggravating evidence. However, the Zant Court held out as an
exception aggravating evidence that involves constitutionally protected
acts. The Court in Dawson further developed this prong of the Zant
aggravating evidence test, relying on the statement in Zant that an
aggravating circumstance is invalid if "'it authorizes a jury to draw
adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected."' ' 13
Thus, because the First Amendment protects freedom of association,
evidence dealing with this type of activity generally should be held
inadmissible as an aggravating factor.
Although the Court in Dawson did not erect aper se barrier to the
admission of constitutionally protected beliefs, it does require that the
prosecution show that the aggravating evidence is directly tied to the
defendant's culpability. This is no different from the usual limitations on
First Amendment rights. For example, freedom of speech is protected by
the First Amendment, but "fighting words" or yelling "Fire!" in a
crowded theater and inciting a panic are not.
II. The Use of Irrelevant and Prejudicial Evidence
In Aggravation
Dawson also has significance as a case dealing with due process and
Eighth Amendment relevancy concerns with aggravating evidence.
Dawson can be argued as establishing that prejudicial aggravating
evidence must be excluded if it is not sufficiently probative to the issue
being tried. In order for aggravating evidence to be admitted, the
prosecution must explicitly tie the aggravating evidence to the defendant's
culpability.
14
This proposition is apparent in the Dawson Court's finding that the
defendant's first amendment rights give way if the prosecution is able to
establish a relevant connection between the evidence and the defendant's
11 Dawson, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. The Dawson Court adheres to this
constitutional standard when it states that Delaware is prevented from
"employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing
hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried."
1 462 U.S. 862 (1983). The Zant court held that "statutory
aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at
the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution does not require the
jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of
selecting ... those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death."
crime. The Court concluded that "the Constitution does not erect aper
se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations
are protected by the First Amendment."15 However, the Court further
stated that the evidence must have an actual bearing on the issues being
tried. 16 For example, in Dawson the prosecution could not admit the
Aryan Brotherhood evidence simply as a means of rebutting the
defendant's "good character" evidence nor as "bad" character evidence
in its own right. 17 Viewed in this light, the broader proposition of
Dawson is that introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
violates the defendant's right to a fair proceeding under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
III. Conclusion: Dawson as a Shield Against
Aggravating Evidence
Defense attorneys should be aware of how Dawson might limit the
prosecutor's ability to introduce aggravating evidence. This is of great
importance in Virginia, because Virginia generously allows the admis-
sion of aggravating evidence for sentencing consideration. When
confronted with aggravating evidence that has slight probative value,
defense counsel should argue that Dawson bars the admission of irrel-
evant and prejudicial evidence. For example, counsel might argue at both
the pretrial and sentencing stages that questionable aggravating evidence
is "not sufficiently relevant" under theDawson standard. Thus, when the
defense prepares its sentencing strategy, it must focus on and plan how
it will argue the irrelevancy of any aggravating evidence presented by the
State.
Although the Court has made it clear that there is no per se barrier
to the use of group-based activities as aggravating evidence, defense
counsel should attempt to use Dawson where associational First Amend-
ment rights are involved. Counsel should argue that before the State is
permitted to admit constitutionally protected activities, Dawson de-
mands that it must first firmly establish a relevant relationship between
the aggravating evidence and the defendant's culpability.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
13 Dawson, 112 S.Ct. at 1097 (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 885).
14 Even in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2733 (1991), which
allowed the prosecution to introduce "victim impact" testimony, the
Court went to great pains to assert that evidence of the "harm" caused was
relevant to the defendant's culpability for the crime. See case summary
of Paine, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.4, No.1, p. 14 (1991).
5 Dawson, 112 S.Ct. at 1097.
16 Id. at 1099.
17 Id.
